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SOME ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF TERTIARY EDUCATION
Dante B. Canlas
It is generally agreed among social scientists that the tertiary
education sector in the Philippines is facing serious problems.
Concern has been raisedabout the seemingfailure of the sector to
respond to the manpower needsof a technologically changing en-
vironment, its inability to deliver higher education to a wide base,
and the deterioration in academicstandards.
There is lessagreement, however, about what policy should be
implemented to arrest these sorry trends in tertiary education.
This paper therefore attempts to present some of the perspectives
that economistslend to the analysisof markets for higher education
and the policy issues that emergefrom suchanalysis.The objective
of this brief paper is to focus the issues rather than to settle specific
policy debates.
Economists usually emphasize the ability of markets to coor-
dinate a set of interdependent activities and to uncover factors that
causefriction in the processof exchange. From a policy standpoint,
the usualapproach is to make a critical assessmentof what cons-
titutes market failure and then draw attention to the appropriate
nonmarket channels - taxes and expenditures - that would correct
the inefficient allocation processes.
This paper tries to assemble some issues related to the role of the
government in highereducation, ratesof return from investments in
human capital, an absent or limited loan market for tertiaW educa-
tion, tuition fees,and, finally, labor market policiesin shapinghouse-
hold investmentdecisionsfor education.
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Public Provisionof Higher Education
It is a fact that higher education in the Philippinesis provided
by both the public and private sectors.This set up somehowraises
the question of whether the public sector should provide tertiary
education or not. It becomes useful, therefore, to review, at this
point, the arguments that warrant public provision of higher
education.
First, it has beenarguedthat tertiary educationhassomedimen-
sions of a public good and tends to be underprovided, if left to a
market that is unregulated, it is also held that higher education
creates some external economiesor third-party effects which the
individual or the institution providing the tertiary education is not
ableto captureor appropriate.
For example, if an institution of higher learningproducessome
graduateswho later on turn out to be good leadersand statesmen,
which the society values, some external economies are created.
However, there isno market that translatesthesevalues into pay-
mentsfor the providerof the service.As a result,there isa tendency
on thepart of the institution to underprovidethe service.
Similarly, a physicianwho successfullytreats a patient afflicted
with a contagiousdiseasecreatessomeexternal benefitsif hisservices
help prevent the spreadof the disease.If theseexternal benefits can-
not be privately appropriated, however, individualsand households
tend to under-investin a medicaleducation.
In the absenceof private marketsthat enablethe providerof the
external economiesto be properly recompensed,an output that is
lessthan the efficient level could be expected. To improve on the
market process,then, someforcesfavoringpublic provisionof higher
educationarelikely to emerge.
Second, another sourceof value for tertiary educationfor which
no private marketsexist refers to what has beentermed as"option
demand." Some parentswith children in private colleges and univer-
sities may have no intention of enrolling them in state-runcolleges
and universities. However, they have an interest in seeingthat state-
owned, low-costinstitutionsof higherlearningare maintained in case
some unforeseen circumstancesnecessitatetheir availment of the
servicesof these public institutions. There is no private market for
which this value - the willingnessto pay for the option to usein
some unrealized state of nature - can be appropriated by the166 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
provider. Again, this form of market failure is invoked to justify
public provision of higher education.
Third, another argument favoring public provision of higher
education rests on market imperfections which lead to inefficient
outcomes. If private markets for higher education are slow to adjust
to resource shifts, public policy may hasten the adjustment process.
As an example, suppose that in line with an industrialization drive
that is deemed socially desirable, the demand for technically trained
manpower increases. If, at the start, these persons are in short supply
and markets are slow to adjust, the existing supply earns high rents
over a relatively long period. In the short run, this bottleneck creates
a wagedrift and leads to unstable prices. In this case,public policy
can increase the supply of technical manpower through fellowships,
researchgrants, and other forms of assistance.
Even if markets are functioning smoothly, demand for public
provision of higher education may still arise. Some people value a
more equitable distribution of income and wealth and would be sup-
portive of public policies that redistribute income and wealth. If
these people perceive that investment in higher education is one way
of improving the distribution, then a collective voice demandingthe
public provision of higher education might be heard.
Returnsto Investment in Higher Education
Supposeit hasbeenestablishedthat tertiary educationhassome
dimensionsof a public good and that publicprovisionor supplemen-
tation of private provisionis warranted.What returnscanindividuals
or society in general expect from investmentsin highereducation?
Individual decisionson whether or not to pursuehigher educa
tion rest on a comparisonof the marginalefficiency of investmentin
higher education with the marginal cost of the investment) If the
former exceedsthe latter, then the investmentisworth undertaking.
For sometime, calculation of real private rates of return to various
levels of educational investment occupied the attention of many
economists.One estimate using 1971 Philippine survey data showed
that the private real rate of return to higher education was 9.5
1. For a fuller treatment,seethe human-capital investment approach to
education. The bookthat looksat all the importantquestions in thisfieldis
GaryBecker, HumanCapital,NewYork:Columbia University Press, 1964.CANLAS: TERTIARY EDUCATION 167
percent.2 If the real interest rate, that is, the nominal interest rate
lessthe expected inflation rate, is lessthan 9.5 percent, then invest-
ment in highereducation isa sound undertaking.
If the calculation of total cost includesthe social resourcecost,
then the exercisewill yield the social, ratherthan the private, rate of
return. If there isa divergencebetween the private and social ratesof
return, sometax and subsidyschememay be implemented to achieve
a convergenceof the two rates.
It isuseful to point out that, in getting the private rate of return,
after-tax incomes are the relevant returns. The choice of income-tax
ratesmight then havesomenonneutral effectson individual decisions
to invest in education. If investment in education pushespeople to
upper income-tax brackets but no correspondingdeduction for the
cost of education is made, there could be someadverseimplications
on attained schooling levels. However, to the extent that a large
proportion of total cost of education investment is foregone earn-
ings,then the taxes saved while in school tend to offset the addi-
tional taxes that are forthcoming after the investment has been
made, rendering the effects of taxes on educational investment
neu'tral.
It is alsouseful to note that a downward adjustment in the cal-
culation of the private rate of return is warranted in case educa-
tional institutions perform only the function of sorting out indivi-
duals according to ability.3 In other words, individuals with high
abilitiesare alsothe oneswho make investmentsin highereducation,
and the function of the institutions of higher learning issimply to
certify or signalto would-be employers who the more able workers
are. If this isthe true function of collegesand universities,then the
private rate of return mostly reflects the return to innate ability,
ratherthan thecontribution of highereducation.
Finally, it Should be pointed out that the rate-of-return calcula-
tion normally abstracts from the consumption value of education.
In some environments where higher education mostly consistsof
2. SeeGeorge Psacharopoulos, "Returnsto Education: AnUpdated Interna-
tionalComparison," in T. King(ed.),Educationand Income,WorldBankStaff
Working Paper No.402,Washington, D.C.,July1980.
3. Thisviewof education asafilterandtheequilibrium situation itgives rise
to iswelkdiscussed by KennethArrowin "Educationasa Filter,"Journalof
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the prestige, liberal-arts variety addressing the consumption needs
of an elite Class,the production values are swamped by the con-
sumption values of higher education. It is clear that in an extreme
case like this, anyone is hard-pressedto present a casefor public
support of highereducation.
Capital Markets for HigherEducation
Referring now to the flipside of the investment-decisionprob-
lem - the cost of borrowing for investment in higher education
- if individuals are faced with a perfect capital or loan market for
higher education, then the investment-decision problem applied to
tertiary education is a straightforward matter once the private rate
of return has been estimated. What is observedin real-world situa-
tions, however, is a very limited, if not absent, capital market for
this purpose. What might explain this limited-market phenomenon?
In non-slaveeconomieswhereskills acquired by individuals can-
not be usedascollateral for an education loan, a capital market for
tt_is purpose cannot evolve. The other reasonsthat have been put
forward to explain a limited capital market for higher education
stressthe role of imperfect information. Lenderstypically have im-
perfect information about the quality of potential borrowers. 4
Borrowersdiffer in their probability of repaying loans- -- someare
high-risk while others are low-risk borrowers.At the start, the lender
has no way of distinguishingborrowersby risk type. Unable to dis-
tinguish borrowers by risk type, it cannot use a pricing mechanism
that would discouragehigh-risk borrowers from borrowing. To be
able to distinguishborrowers by risk type, it hasto resort to some
information gathering devices. However, this is costly and tends to
reduce the expected profits of the lender on the average.Hence, the
lesscostly way to do things is simply to withhold loansfor this pur-
pose.
Another information problemthatarises is when paymentson
education loans arecontingent on future earnings of theborrower,
that is, laborearnings after completing hiseducation. Repayment
of the loanisnearly impossible iftheindividual generates a stream
4. The roleof imperfectinformation jncredit marketsand therationing that
result.s, seeJoseph StiglitzandAndrewWeiss, "CreditRationing inMarkets with
Imperfect Information," American Economic Review,Vol. 7 (june 1981),
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of sufficiently low earnings. To ,the lender, however, it is not clear
at all if the state of low earnings is a genuinerisk or the result of
some willful actions, s For example, the borrower may be a shirker
on the job. Alternatively, he may b,etoo lazy to engagein an active
job searchso that he can improve on an existing poor worker-job
match. Again, the costliness of trying to ascertainthe reasonsbehind
the state of low earnings forces the potential lender to withhold
funds for highereducation.
The limited-market phenomenon givesrise to a policy question.
Should the government intervene in the loan market if private
markets are slow to evolve.7 There is nopresumption that it should,
unlessit has a comparative advantage in getting information about
default risks of Potential borrowers. However, equity considerations
mighthelp legitimize a role for government.
It hasbeenobservedthat attained schooling levelsare positively
correlated with parental income. This has, in turn, led to the sug-
gestion that the ability to internally finance schoolingtendsto per-
petuate inequality in schoolingand incomedistribution acrossgene-
rations.
A survey was made in 1961 by the.International Labour Office
on the sourcesof financing for out,f-pocket expensesof higher
education. About 60 percent of total expenditures were financed
by parents, 10, percent by relatives,20 percent by earningsduring
vacation, 3 percent by savingsbefore college,and the residualof 1
percent by other means. Loans did not merit a separatecategory.
From casual observation,this methodof financingeducationhas
not changedmuch. It would then be reasonableto expect accessto
higher educationby low-income groups to be very limited. Some
people value equality in attained schoolinglevels,and if this valua-
tion can be constituted into a strong demand for collectiveaction,
policymakers shouldthink of some tax and subsidymeasuressothat
loansto low-incomegroupsfor higher education can be made avail-
atile_atreasonablerates.
To improve repayment rates, the governmentcan useits police
5. Thisistheproblem of moralhazard whichiswell-defined intheinsurance
_literature. See KennethArrow,"PoliticalandEconomic Evaluation of Social
EffectsandExternalities," in M.D. Intriligator (ed.),Frontiersof Quantitative
Economics,North-Holland Publish ingCo.,1971.170 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
power and coercive power to tax. This is one advantage that the
government has over the private sector.
Tuition Feesand the Pricingof Higher Education
Markets for higher education share Some characteristics with
other markets. The price structure helps'determine whether or not
demand for and supply of various types of training of differing
quality will be forthcoming. The price of any giventype of training
in an institution of higher learning refers to the cost of foregone
opportunities, that is, what consumers must give up in other con-
sumption opportunities and what resourcesare required to produce
the service. For example, the price of a medical education might
involve the sacrifice by the householdof, say, a new car. At the same
time, the price provides inducements to medical schools and phy-
siciansto allocate resourcesfor medicaltraining.
Tuition and other fees, along with other entrance requirements,
can be used as screening devicesto induce self-selection among ap-
plicants. Students are heterogeneous,differing in their probability
of successfully completing the requirementsfor a degree.The tuition
fee can be usedas a deviceso that students with low probability of
getting a degree will not apply. If tuition fees are very low, far too
many students would apply which subsequently raisesthe screening
costs to the university. If kept sufficiently high, only the moreable
students would apply.
Policy discussionabout the tuition-fee structure should recognize
this basic role of prices in markets for higher education. Tuition
fees may come close to playing the usualroleof clearingthe market
in the caseof privateuniversities;but they canhardly be relied upon
to remove the excess demand for university openings in public
universities.
In state universities,administrators are less free to exploit the
screening functions of tuition fees. State universities draw support
from the government budget, grants, and some endowments. Only a
small portion of their revenuescomes from tuition fees. Normally,
the tuition fees charged are below the price that would clear the de-
mand for and supply of university openings.At the level of tuition
fees actually charged, an excess demand for university openings
prevails.CANLAS: TERTIARY EDUCATION 171
Due to their inability to raise tuition fees to the desiredlevels,
administrators and professorstend to have ways of raising the ef-
fective price to the accepted applicants. For example, university
administrators can keep the. quality of laboratory equipment low.
For studentswith cars,the university can ask them to pay for park-
ing stickers and then block off parking slots that are closeto their
classrooms.Professors, on the other hand, can raise the effective
price to studentsby assigningmaterials meaningless to the students
but useful for the mentors' own professional development. For
example, professors can hold back materials useful for passing
examsand concentrate on researchwhich can later on be submitted
to professional journals. They can also cut back their consultation
hours.
The inability of state university administrators to make the
proper tuition fee adjustments adverseiy affects faculty salaries.
To dampen the protest of professors,administrators usually resort
to across-the-boardpay increaseswhich create additional problems.
By not recognizing the fact that private market valuation of some
professions rises faster than others, an across-the-boardincrease
creates a situation where the university gets a surplusof less-able
professorswhosemarket value hasnot risen,and experiencesshort-
agnes in someareaswhere the risein market value exceedsthe across-
the-board pay increase.The university loses,in that when it seeks
replacement for those who had left, it has to pay the prevailing
market price anyway. If it is not willing to pay the market price, it
has to settle for a lower quality replacement. These developments
are referred to by observersof the tertiary education sceneasdete-
rioration in academicstandards.
Labor Market Policiesand Higher Education
It seemsobvious that policies for higher education cannot be
pursued independently of labor market policies. At the very least,
when individuals make decisionsabout investment in higher educa-
tion or occupational choices,past, present, and expected future
returns and costs come into consideration. Labor policies affect
current wagesand employment, helping shape the expectations of
private agentsabout the future behaviorof wagesand employment.
If wagesin some occupations are persistently low, rational in-
dividuals are not likely to invest in those occupations. If it is the172 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVE LOPMENT
result of inappropriate labor market policies, the social cost is that
far too many individuals are turned away. As an example, it has
been suggestedthat the depressed wages and salaries of nursesand
teachers might be the result of the fact that the major "demander"
of their services is the government; it is able to exercise some
monopsonistic powers in the labor market. The persistence of low
wages and salaries in these occupations leads to a situation where
only a handful are entering these occupations, and those who have
entered, withdraw their services from the local labor markets and
offer them elsewhere. Eventually, a shortage arises to the detriment
of the economy's other objectives.
ConcludingRemarks
Finally, the points assembled here are not intended to settle
current policy debates. The analysis made by economists, however,
as indicated here, can help define areas for possible government
intervention. A well-defined role for government, for instance, in
capital markets for higher education is possible and reforms in
tuition fee policy can solve some of the problems facing tertiary
education without turning on some seriousequity problems.
The points raisedin this paper will hopefully take the discussion
of policy and tuition fee reforms in higher educationaway from the
notion that they are imposed from outside or that the people are
miseducated.The notion is not, from a policy standpoint, insightful.